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National “Red Lines”
Undermine European
Budgetary Reform
The discussions among Member States
on the budget of the European Union
for the period 2007-2013 have reached
an impasse. Member states want to
keep as much as possible their receipts
from the budget, while at the same time
reducing their contributions. Naturally,
this is not a solution that can apply
simultaneously to all of them.
The member state which is in the
most awkward position is the UK. For
domestic political reasons, the UK
government refuses to make conces-
sions on an outdated and indefensible
instrument of the EUs’ budgetary arrangements, which is
known as the UK “rebate”.
The rebate was introduced in 1984 as compensation to
the UK for not having a large agricultural sector and for
trading extensively with non-EU countries. At that time,
close to 80% of the EU’s expenditure went to farming and
about half of its revenue came from tariffs on imports of
non-EU products. The UK, with its traditional links with the
Commonwealth and North America, paid a dispropor-
tionately large amount into the EU budget and received a
disproportionately small amount from Brussels.
Regardless of the fact that budgetary surpluses and
deficits are partial and misleading indicators of the benefits
and costs of EU membership, all Member States have
drawn their “red lines” in the current negotiations on the
Financial Framework for the period 2007 to 2013. The
large net payers such as Germany, France, the Netherlands
and Sweden and the UK demand a reduction in overall
expenditure. Ironically, the UK also wants to maintain its
rebate. Naturally, the net
recipient counties do not
want to lose their sub-
sidies. Any way you see
it, money to or from
Brussels is important in
domestic politics. Even
the eurosceptic Polish
farmers are reported to
have softened their views
after receiving subsidies
from the EU’s agricul-
tural fund.
In the absence of any cohesive vision, the opposing
claims will probably degenerate into coarse bargaining
with the same results as in previous
budgetary negotiations. In the end,
any agreement on the 2007-2013
Framework will be a mixture of com-
promises without much logic.
       There will be no long-term solution,
unless the EU deals with the problems
on the expenditure side of the budget.
This is because EU spending is a
patchwork of policies some of which
have become obsolete. By contrast, on
the revenue side, the contributions of
the Member States are largely based
on a reasonable principle: the size of
their economies and therefore their relative wealth.
Successive GATT rounds have also meant that tariffs now
generate a very small proportion of EU revenue so they
hardly skew payments by member state.
On the expenditure side, the UK Treasury published in
March 2003 a paper that made a number of sensible
proposals on how to rationalise EU spending. Eighty per
cent of that spending goes to farming and structural
projects mostly in poorer regions. The Treasury paper
argued for concentration of structural expenditure in the
most needy regions of the Union. It rightly asked, why
recycle funds through Brussels.
The Commission proposals which are presently being
negotiated also advocate similar concentration. But they
have two grave flaws that undermine the logic of
concentration. They grandfather all currently eligible regions
and they make funding available to poor regions in
relatively rich countries.
Regions such as Western Ireland have per capita incomes
that far exceed the
threshold of eligibility for
regional funds, which
stands at 75% of EU
average income. Yet
they will continue recei-
ving EU financial support
simply because they
receive it today.
Other regions with per
capita income below the
threshold of 75% are lo-
cated in relatively rich countries such as Belgium, Sweden
or the UK all three of which have per capita at about 117%
of EU average.
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The EU should support those
policies that make it more
cohesive, more competitive
and give it a more effective
voice in the world.E
I
P
A
S
C
O
P
E
 
 
B
u
l
l
e
t
i
n
 
2
0
0
5
/
1
www.eipa.nl
46
The principle of cohesion, which is enshrined in the EU
Treaty, suggests that structural funding should be allocated
to Member States according to their need which translates
into their ability to provide financial resources for the
growth of their poor regions. The EU should support those
Member States which do not have that ability. Solidarity
would then mean support for
poor regions in poor coun-
tries – not just poor regions
irrespective of whether they
are located in poor or rich
countries. Rich Member States
with poor regions can
mobilise domestic resources
for the development of their
underdeveloped regions. As
the Treasury paper asked,
why recycle funds through
Brussels?
On agriculture the UK views are well known. It prefers
elimination or drastic reduction of subsidies to farmers. But
this has implications for its rebate that need to be drawn
out. When agricultural funding was mostly in the form of
output subsidies – i.e. before the reforms introduced in
1992 – it did make sense to centralise support through the
EU budget. Otherwise there would have been large
distortions of competition.
Now, however, that funding is largely de-coupled from
production and will be even more so in the future, there is
hardly any justification for centralised funding. Member
states can indeed give income supplements to their farmers
without distorting competition. This means that most
agricultural spending can and should be re-nationalised. It
would reduce significantly overall EU expenditure and at
the same time remove the need for the UK rebate.
The problem is that France opposes vehemently any
reduction in agricultural spending. In fact, in October
2002, France and Germany pre-empted any meaningful
EU reform by undertaking a commitment to maintain
agricultural subsidies at their present level until 2013. At
the same time, France wants the UK rebate to be phased
out. This in itself is an untenable position.
The EU has a last chance
to rationalise its budget
before the next enlargement
will make it virtually impos-
sible. Both Bulgaria and
Romania have relatively very
large agricultural sectors and
it is obvious where they will
draw their red lines.
Despite the apparent in-
transigence of national posi-
tions, it is rather clear what
kind of reform makes sense for the EU in the longer term.
The EU should support those policies that make it more
cohesive, more competitive and give it a more effective
voice in the world: i.e. structural actions, research and
development, external action and development aid.
   The time has come to end both the UK rebate and
recycled funding for farmers and regions of rich Member
States. Perhaps it may be possible for France to accept
lower support of agriculture if the UK would give up its
rebate. If that could happen it would rationalise the budget
of the Union and would make the most significant
contribution to streamlining EU policies.
NOTES NOTES NOTES NOTES NOTES
1 The views expressed here are purely personal. ::
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The time has come to
end both the UK rebate
and recycled funding for
farmers and regions of
rich Member States.